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Abstract
The Naor-Yung paradigm (Naor and Yung, STOC ’90) allows to generically boost se-
curity under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) to security against chosen-ciphertext attacks
(CCA) for public-key encryption (PKE) schemes. The main idea is to encrypt the plain-
text twice (under independent public keys), and to append a non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof that the two ciphertexts indeed encrypt the same message. Later work by
Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup (Eurocrypt ’09) and Naor and Segev (Crypto ’09 and
SIAM J. Comput. ’12) established that the very same techniques can also be used in the
settings of key-dependent message (KDM) and key-leakage attacks (respectively).
In this paper we study the conditions under which the two ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung
construction can share the same random coins. We find that this is possible, provided that
the underlying PKE scheme meets an additional simple property. The motivation for re-
using the same random coins is that this allows to design much more efficient NIZK proofs.
We showcase such an improvement in the random oracle model, under standard complexity
assumptions including Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Quadratic Residuosity, and Subset Sum.
The length of the resulting ciphertexts is reduced by 50%, yielding truly efficient PKE
schemes achieving CCA security under KDM and key-leakage attacks.
As an additional contribution, we design the first PKE scheme whose CPA security
under KDM attacks can be directly reduced to (low-density instances of) the Subset Sum
assumption. The scheme supports key-dependent messages computed via any affine function
of the secret key.
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1 Introduction
Forty years ago, in their seminal paper [DH76], Diffie and Hellman put forward the concept of
public-key cryptography. Since then, the field has experienced huge advances, making public-
key encryption (PKE) one of the most fundamental and deployed cryptographic applications.
Intuitively, PKE allows a sender to encrypt a message under a receiver’s public key; the receiver,
holding the corresponding secret key, is the only one able to decrypt the resulting ciphertext
and thus recover the transmitted message. In order for the above idea to work we need a
mechanism to certify users’ public keys, which is typically achieved using digital signatures
within a public-key infrastructure.
1.1 Motivation
It is of fundamental importance to understand what type of security properties a PKE scheme
should satisfy, in order to be used effectively in applications. The most basic requirement is
to say that it should be unfeasible to recover the plaintext behind a given ciphertext. This is,
however, not sufficient in many applications, as it does not exclude, e.g., the possibility that
one is able to recover partial information on the encrypted message.
Seminal work on the subject [Yao82, GM84, MRS88] established the equivalence of different
formulations leading to the following minimal requirement: No efficient adversary, given a target
public key, should be able to distinguish the encryption of two chosen messages. This notion is
often known under the name of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), and
it is by far the most basic security requirement a PKE scheme should meet. Yet, CPA security is
insufficient in many applications. For instance, in some case, we might require ciphertexts to be
non-malleable, meaning that it should be hard, given a ciphertext encrypting some message, to
create a valid ciphertext encrypting a related message; non-malleable PKE [DDN91, BDPR98,
PSV07, CDTV16] is important in many contexts, e.g., for online auctions.
The de-facto standard notion of security for PKE is called indistinguishability under chosen-
ciphertext attacks (CCA) which requires that CPA security should hold even in the presence of
decryption queries (i.e., the adversary is allowed to ask for the decryption of arbitrary messages
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but the challenge ciphertext). It is important to note that CCA security is not a theoretical
concern, as emphasized by the celebrated Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS #1 [Ble98]. However,
there are specific settings in which even CCA security is not enough. We review two such settings
below.
KDM attacks. An adversary might be able to see ciphertexts encrypting messages related
to the secret key. This is the case, e.g., in disk encryption software (including Windows Vista’s
BitLocker utility) and in certain anonymous credential systems [CL01], or could be due to
careless key management. Further, to apply techniques like bootstrapping [Gen09] or key-
switching [BGV12] to reduce the noise and ciphertext growth in fully-homomorphic encryption,
it is necessary to publish a ciphertext which encrypts its own secret key.
Such key-dependent message (KDM) attacks are captured within the notions of CPA/CCA
security by requiring that encryptions of messages depending on the secret key (via adversarial
functions) are indistinguishable from encryptions of a fixed string [BRS02, CL01].
Several PKE schemes with CPA/CCA-KDM security exist, under different complexity as-
sumptions including Learning with Errors [ACPS09, BGK11], Decisional Diffie-Hellman [BHHO08,
BGK11, Hof13, Wee16], Quadratic Residuosity [BG10, Hof13, Wee16], and Learning Parity with
Noise [Do¨t15].
Key-leakage attacks. An adversary might be able to learn partial information on the se-
cret key by means of so-called side-channel attacks, exploiting physical phenomena such as
timing [Koc96], power consumption [KJJ99], and electronic emission [QS01]. Such bounded
key-leakage attacks are captured within the notions of CPA/CCA security by empowering the
adversary with access to a so-called Λ-leakage oracle: Upon input an efficiently computable
function, the oracle returns the result of the function applied to the secret key, for a total of at
most Λ bits.
Several PKE schemes with CPA/CCA security under bounded key-leakage attacks exist,
under different complexity assumptions including Learning with Errors [AGV09], Decisional
Diffie-Hellman [NS09, DHLW10, NS12], and Quadratic Residuosity [BG10].
1.2 Our Contributions
The Naor-Yung paradigm is a method to generically transform a CPA-secure PKE scheme into
a CCA-secure one, in a non-black-box way. Specifically, to encrypt a given message m, one
samples two independent public keys pk and pk ′ for the underlying CPA-secure PKE, encrypts
the message m twice yielding ciphertexts c and c′ (the first one under pk and the second one
under pk ′), and finally gives a non-interactive proof pi that the ciphertexts indeed encrypt the
same message. One can show that if the non-interactive proof satisfies zero-knowledge, and
moreover it is simulation-sound [Sah99], the resulting PKE meets CCA security.
Later work by Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup [CCS09], and by Naor and Segev [NS09,
NS12], showed that the original Naor-Yung paradigm also works in the more generic settings
of KDM attacks and key-leakage attacks. However, the resulting PKE scheme is not very effi-
cient in the standard model due to the cost of simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof systems. The efficiency of the Naor-Yung paradigm is very competitive, instead,
in the random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], where each party (including the
adversary) is given access to a random hash function. As proven by Faust et al. [FKMV12], the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] is sufficient for instantiating the NIZK in the Naor-Yung construc-
tion (in the ROM), leading the most efficient instantiations of PKE schemes with CCA security
under KDM and key-leakage attacks known today.
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A twist of Naor-Yung. In this work we analyze a slight modification of the original Naor-
Yung paradigm. The main idea is to have the two ciphertexts c and c′ share the same random
coins. As we will see, this allows for a substantial efficiency improvement in the design of
the NIZK, yielding beyond state-of-the-art PKE schemes with CCA security under KDM and
key-leakage attacks (in the ROM).
Our analysis (see Section 3) shows that the above idea indeed works, provided that the
underlying CPA-secure PKE scheme meets an additional property that we dub “randomness
fusion”: Given two ciphertexts c and c′ of messages m and m′ respectively (computed under
independent public keys pk and pk ′) it is possible to re-randomize (c, c′) into a new pair (c˜, c˜′)
such that the distribution of (c˜, c˜′) is statistically close to the distribution of (cˆ, cˆ′) where (cˆ, cˆ′)
are computed using the normal encryption with the same (uniform) randomness r∗.
A similar requirement has been put forward by Bellare et al. [BBS03] in their study of
randomness re-use in multi-recipient PKE. Our requirement is however weaker than the one
in [BBS03], and, as we show, it is sufficient for our application.
KDM security from Subset Sum. As a contribution of independent interest, in Section 4,
we design the first PKE scheme whose KDM-CPA security can be based directly on low-density
instances of the Subset Sum problem. Such an assumption is particularly interesting given its
robustness to quantum attacks [BJLM13]. The set of supported KDM functions consists of
all possible (efficiently computable) affine modifications of the secret key; a result of Apple-
baum [App11, App14] allows to generically boost this form of KDM security to security against
all functions that can be computed in some fixed polynomial time.
Our construction borrows ideas from [ACPS09], that we needed to carefully adapt to the
case of Subset Sum. The PKE scheme we design can be effectively used in our framework (as we
argue below), yielding a truly efficient PKE scheme with CCA-KDM security from the Subset
Sum assumption (in the ROM).
Comparison. Finally, we instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung construction under three
complexity assumptions: Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Quadratic Residuosity, and Subset Sum.
As our analysis shows (see Section 5), ciphertexts computed via our approach are shorter by a
factor of roughly 50% compared to those one would obtain via the original Naor-Yung paradigm.
The reason behind such an efficiency improvement is best understood using an example.
Consider the ElGamal PKE scheme [ElG85], whose CPA-security can be based on the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption. A public key consists of a single element h, within a cyclic group
G of prime order q (with generator g); an encryption of m ∈ G under h equals c := (c1, c2) =
(gr, hr · m), for uniform randomness r ∈ Zq. The PKE scheme is easily seen to meet the
randomness fusion property.1
When using the above PKE scheme in the original Naor-Yung construction one samples
two independent public keys h, h′ ∈ G, and computes a “double encryption” of message m
by defining c := (c1, c2) = (g
r, hr · m) and c′ := (c′1, c′2) = (gr
′
, (h′)r′ · m), for independent
randomness r, r′ ∈ Zq. Finally, one needs to compute a (simulation-sound) NIZK proof pi for
the fact that c and c′ are well-distributed ciphertexts encrypting the same messages; this is
equivalent to showing knowledge of r, r′ such that c1 = gr, c′1 = gr
′
, and c2/c
′
2 = h
r/(h′)r′ . We
refer to the pair x := (r, r′) as the witness, and to y := (h, (c1, c2), h′, (c′1, c′2)) as the statement
to be proven.
1In fact, it satisfies the reproducibility test of Bellare et al. [BBS03] which implies the randomness fusion
property.
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The standard way to compute pi (in the ROM) is by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [FS86] to a so-called Sigma-protocol for the above considered language.2 In the case of
ElGamal (see [FKMV12, Section 5]) pi := (α, γ), where α := (α1, α2, α3) = (g
s, gs
′
, hs · (h′)s′)
and γ := (γ1, γ2) = (s − βr, s′ + βr′), with random s, s′ ∈ Zq and β implicitly defined as
β := H(y||α) through the application of the random oracle H.
This way, a ciphertext consists of 9 group elements. Using our twist of the Naor-Yung
construction one can completely drop α2 and γ2, thus saving 3 group elements (note that
c1 = c
′
1). Hence, a ciphertext consists of 6 group elements yielding a 33% gain in ciphertext
size. While the above instantiation is not interesting on its own right (as one can obtain
CCA security in the standard model under the same complexity assumption, with even shorter
ciphertexts [CS98]) it contains the crux of our method, and moreover it constitutes the base for
understanding our concrete instantiations in Section 5.
1.3 Related Work
The first PKE scheme with CPA security directly based on Subset Sum has been constructed by
Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev [LPS10]; their work has recently been extended to the setting
of CCA security by Faust, Masny, and Venturi [FMV16]. Subset Sum also found application in
the context of outsourced pattern matching [FHV13].
While we focused on public-key encryption, KDM security can also be defined in the secret-
key setting. See, among others, [BRS02, ACPS09]. Sometimes KDM security is defined in
a multi-key variant, where there are polynomially many public/secret key pairs and the key-
dependent message is chosen as a function of all the keys. Although our twist of the Naor-Yung
paradigm works even in the multi-user setting, our Subset Sum based PKE scheme is only
proven secure in the single-key setting.
Many definitions for security under key-leakage attacks exist in the literature, beyond the
setting of bounded leakage considered in this paper. We refer the reader directly to the literature
(e.g., [ADW09b, SPY+10]) for a more in-depth discussion on the relevance of each definition.
We also dispose of many leakage-resilient primitives beyond public-key encryption, see, among
many others, [DP08, ADW09a, KV09, DDV10, BSW13, NVZ14, FNV15].
Rackoff and Simon [RS91] considered a variation of the Naor-Yung paradigm in which the
sender encrypts the message only once, and then it proves in zero-knowledge that it knows
the plaintext corresponding to the transmitted ciphertext. In order for this to work, the NIZK
proof system needs to satisfy a stronger version of soundness known as simulation extractability.
Unfortunately, this paradigm does not lead to very efficient instantiations in the ROM due to the
fact that Fiat-Shamir NIZK are not known to be simulation extractable. (See [BFW15, BFW16]
for negative indications on this matter.) An alternative (always in the ROM) is to use Fischlin’s
transformation [Fis05], but the price to instantiate the NIZK might be higher [DV14].
An alternative construction to generically boost CPA security to CCA security for PKE
in the random oracle model is due to Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO99]. The security of this
construction under KDM attacks has been recently analyzed in [KMHT16].
2A Sigma-protocol is a public-coin interactive protocol consisting of three messages (α, β, γ), satisfying certain
properties; see Section 5 for a more precise definition.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We write λ ∈ N for the security parameter. We say that a function ν is negligible in λ, if it is
asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in λ, i.e. ν(λ) = λ−ω(1). An algorithm
A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized, and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1}∗ the
computation of A(x; r) (i.e., A with input x and random coins r) terminates in at most poly(|x|)
steps. When the coins are left implicit, we write y←$ A(x) to denote the output of A(x; r) with
uniform randomness. If X is a set, then x←$ X denotes that x is sampled uniformly at random
from X .
For a distribution D, we denote with x←$ D that x is sampled according to the distribution
D. For two distributions D and D′ over a shared domain D we write D(x) for the probability
assigned to x ∈ D and ∆ (D,D′) := 12
∑
x∈D |D(x)−D′(x)| for the statistical distance between
D and D′. Whenever the statistical distance is negligible, we write D ≈s D′. Similarly, given
two ensembles X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N, we write X ≈c Y to denote that the two
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
Vectors and matrices are denoted in boldface. For two vectors u,v, with u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn), the inner product between u and v is defined as 〈u,v〉 :=
∑n
i=1 ui ·vi. We
represent elements in Zp as values in the range [−(p− 1)/2, (p− 1)/2], where p > 2 is a prime
number. The absolute value of v ∈ Zp, denoted |v|, is the absolute value of the corresponding
value in [−(p − 1)/2, (p − 1)/2], and the infinity norm of a vector v := (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Znp is
‖v‖∞ := maxi∈[n] |vi|. We will also use the following rounding functions: b·e : R → Z which
maps a real number to its closest integer, b·c : R → Z which maps a real number to its closest
smaller integer, and d·e : R → Z which maps a real number to its closest larger integer. For
any q, p ∈ N, we denote by bxep : Zq → Zp the rounding function bxep := bpq · xe; in case v is a
vector, we write bvep for the application of b·ep component wise.
2.2 Public-Key Encryption
A Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined as
follows. (1) Algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter and outputs a public/secret
key pair (pk , sk); for a given value of the security parameter λ ∈ N, the set of all secret keys is
denoted by SKλ and the set of all public keys by PKλ. (2) The randomized algorithm Enc takes
as input the public key pk , a message m ∈ M, and implicit randomness r ∈ R, and outputs a
ciphertext c = Enc(pk ,m; r); the set of all ciphertexts is denoted by C and we sometimes write
µ ∈ N for the bit-length of a plaintext m ∈ M. (3) The deterministic algorithm Dec takes as
input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C and outputs m = Dec(sk , c) which is either equal
to some message m ∈M or to an error symbol ⊥.
Correctness. We say that Π satisfies correctness if for all (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ) there exists a
negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that that P[Dec(sk ,Enc(pk ,m)) = m] ≥ 1− ν(λ) (where
the randomness is taken over the internal coin tosses of algorithm Enc).
KDM security. We now turn to defining key-dependent message (KDM) security for PKE,
both in the case of chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
Definition 1 (KDM security). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message space
M and secret-key space SKλ (for security parameter λ ∈ N), and let F : SKλ →M be a set of
efficiently computable functions. We say that Π has F-key-dependent message security under
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Experiment Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F):
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); b←$ {0, 1}
Qdec,Qkdm ← ∅
b′ ← AOdecsk (·),Okdmsk,b (·)(pk)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (Qdec ∩Qkdm = ∅)
Oracle Okdmsk ,b (f):
If b = 0
Return c←$ Enc(pk , 0µ)
Else
Return c←$ Enc(pk , f(sk))
Qkdm ← Qkdm ∪ {c}
Oracle Odecsk (c):
Return Dec(sk , c)
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c}
Figure 1: Experiment defining KDM security of a PKE scheme.
chosen-ciphertext attacks (F-KDM-CCA for short), if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a
negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣∣∣P [Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where the experiment Expkdm-ccaΠ,A (λ,F) is defined in Figure 1.
Moreover, we say that Π has F-KDM-CPA security if the above holds for all PPT adversaries
that are not allowed any query to oracle Odecsk (·); in this case we denote by Expkdm-cpaΠ,A (λ,F)
the corresponding experiment.
We remark that F-KDM-CPA security implies standard CPA security by considering the
set F of all constant functions that output a given (hard-coded) plaintext in the message space,
i.e. Fmsg := {fm : fm(·) = m}m∈M.
Key-leakage security. Informally a PKE scheme is CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks
if it remains CPA-secure even given Λ bits of (adaptive) leakage on the secret key [NS09,
DHLW10]. CCA security under Λ-key-leakage attacks is defined similarly, but now the adversary
can additionally ask for decryption queries.
Definition 2 (Key-leakage security). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message
space M and secret-key space SKλ (for security parameter λ ∈ N), and let OΛsk (·) be an
oracle depending on a secret key sk ∈ SKλ, which takes as input (the description of) functions
fi : SKλ → {0, 1}Λi and returns a total of at most
∑
i Λi ≤ Λ bits. We say that Π has Λ-
key-leakage security under chosen-ciphertext attacks (Λ-LKG-CCA for short), if for all PPT
adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣∣∣P [Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where the experiment Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ) is defined in Figure 2. Π has Λ-LKG-CPA security if the
above holds for all PPT adversaries that are not allowed any query to oracle Odecsk (·).
2.3 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge
A decision problem related to a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ requires to determine if a given string y
is in L or not. We can associate to any NP -language L a polynomial-time recognizable relation
R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ defining L itself, i.e. L = {y : ∃x s.t. (y, x) ∈ R} for |x| ≤ poly(|y|). The
string x is called a witness for membership of y ∈ L.
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Experiment Explkg-ccaΠ,A (λ,Λ):
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); b←$ {0, 1}
Qdec ← ∅
(m0,m1)← AOdecsk (·),OΛsk (·)(pk)
cb ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← AOdecsk (·)(cb)
Return (b′ = b) ∧ (cb 6∈ Qdec)
Oracle Odecsk (c):
Return Dec(sk , c)
Qdec ← Qdec ∪ {c}
Oracle OΛsk (f):
Return f(sk)
Figure 2: Experiment defining key-leakage security of a PKE scheme.
Let L be an NP -language. We now recall the definition of a non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) argument system for L, in the random oracle model (ROM). Let H be a hash function
(modeled as a random oracle). A non-interactive argument system for L is a pair of PPT
algorithms (PH ,VH) specified as follows. (1) Algorithm PH takes as input a pair (y, x) such
that (y, x) ∈ R, and returns a proof pi. (2) Algorithm VH takes as input a pair (y, pi) and
returns a decision bit. We write PH , VH , to specify that both algorithms are allowed random
oracle queries.
By correctness, we mean that VH(y, pi) = 1 whenever pi←$ PH(y, x) and (y, x) ∈ R Be-
low we define two further properties of non-interactive arguments, namely zero-knowledge and
simulation soundness. The definitions are taken from [FKMV12].
Zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property captures the intuition that a non-interactive
proof pi for a given statement y does not reveal anything beyond the fact that y ∈ L. This
intuition is formalized by the existence of an efficient simulator S that is able to simulate pi
without knowing a witness. The simulator is allowed to fully control the random oracle, as we
make explicit in the definition below.
Definition 3 (NIZK). Let L be an NP -language, and let H be a hash function (modeled
as a random oracle). Denote by S1,S2 the oracles such that S1(·) returns the first output of
(h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, ·) and S2(y, x) returns the first output of (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, y) if (y, x) ∈ R. We
say that (PH ,VH) is a NIZK for L in the random oracle model, if there exists a PPT simulator
S such that for all PPT distinguishers D there is a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] for which∣∣∣P [DH(·),PH(·,·)(1λ) = 1]− P [DS1(·),S2(·,·)(1λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(λ),
where both oracles P and S2 return ⊥ in case (y, x) 6∈ R.
Simulation Soundness. The simulation soundness property captures the intuition that it
should be hard to find an accepting proof pi for a false statement y 6∈ L, even after seeing
polynomially many simulated proofs of possibly false statements.
Definition 4 (Simulation soundness). Let L be an NP -language, and let H be a hash function
(modeled as a random oracle). Consider a NIZK (PH ,VH) for L, with zero-knowledge simulator
S. Denote by S1, S
′
2 the oracles such that S1(·) returns the first output of (h, τ)←$ S(1, τ, ·)
and S′2(y) returns the first output of (pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, y). We say that (PH ,VH) is simulation
sound in the random oracle model, if for all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible function
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Naor-Yung Paradigm with Shared Randomness
Consider the following PKE scheme Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) based on an auxiliary PKE scheme
Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and on a non-interactive argument system for the language LΠNY of Eq. (1).
Key generation: Given as input the security parameter λ, algorithm Gen∗ runs Gen twice
obtaining (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ) and (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ). Hence, it outputs pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) and
sk∗ = sk (the key sk ′ is erased).
Encryption: Given as input a message m ∈ M, algorithm Enc∗ samples random coins
r∗←$R, computes c = Enc(pk ,m; r∗) and c′ = Enc(pk ′,m; r∗), and obtains a proof
pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), (m, r∗)) for membership of (pk , pk ′, c, c′) ∈ LΠNY. Hence, it outputs the
ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi).
Decryption: Given as input a ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi), algorithm Dec∗ first runs
VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi); if the output is zero Dec∗ outputs ⊥ and stops. Otherwise, it outputs
the same as Dec(sk , c).
Figure 3: Modified Naor-Yung construction
ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
P
[
VS1(y∗, pi∗) = 1 ∧ y∗ 6∈ L ∧ (y∗, pi∗) 6∈ Q : (y∗, pi∗)←$ AS1(·),S′2(·)(1λ)
]
≤ ν(λ),
where Q contains the list of pairs (yi, pii) such that yi was asked to S′2 yielding answer pii.
3 Naor-Yung Paradigm with Shared Randomness
We start by describing a twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm, in Section 3.1, where the same
random string is used to generate both ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung construction. Then, in
Section 3.2, we put forward a simple property of a PKE scheme which will be useful for proving
security of the modified Naor-Yung paradigm. Our main theorem, and its proof, can be found
in Section 3.3 (for the case of KDM security), and in Section 3.4 (for the case of key-leakage).
3.1 A Twist of Naor-Yung
The original Naor-Yung paradigm combines two CPA-secure PKE schemes Π and Π′ into a
new PKE scheme Π∗ that achieves CCA security [NY90]. A ciphertext in Π∗ consists of two
independent encryptions of the same message (using fresh randomness), together with a non-
interactive proof that the two ciphertexts indeed encrypt the same message. This paradigm was
later extended to the setting of KDM security by Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [CCS09],
and to the setting of key-leakage by Naor and Segev [NS09, NS12].
Below, we present a twist of the Naor-Yung construction in which the two encryptions
share the same random coins. As we will see in the sequel (cf. Section 5) this allows for
significant efficiency improvements in the size of the resulting non-interactive proofs. Although
our construction works for any pair of PKE schemes with shared message and randomness space,
for simplicity we consider the special case in which Π′ = Π.
Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme with message spaceM and randomness space R,
and let let (PH ,VH) be a NIZK in the ROM for the following NP -language
LΠNY :=
{
(pk , pk ′, c, c′) : ∃m, r∗ s.t. c = Enc(pk ,m; r∗), c′ = Enc(pk ′,m; r∗)} . (1)
The modified PKE scheme Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) is described in Fig. 3.
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3.2 Randomness Fusion
We now put forward a simple property of a PKE scheme Π which will be useful for proving
security of the modified Naor-Yung construction. Informally, the property says that given two
ciphertexts c and c′ of messages m and m′ respectively (computed under independent public keys
pk and pk ′) it is possible to re-randomize (c, c′) into a new pair (c˜, c˜′) such that the distribution
of (c˜, c˜′) is statistically close to the distribution of (cˆ, cˆ′) where (cˆ, cˆ′) are computed using Enc
with the same (uniform) random input r∗.
Definition 5 (Randomness fusion). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE scheme. There exists
a PPT algorithm Rand such that for all m,m′ ∈ M it holds that Dm,m′ ≈s D˜m,m′ , where the
distributions Dm,m′ and D˜m,m′ are defined as follows:
Dm,m′ :=
{
(cˆ, cˆ′) : (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1
λ); (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ); r∗←$R
cˆ = Enc(pk ,m; r∗); cˆ′ = Enc(pk ′,m′; r∗)
}
(2)
D˜m,m′ :=
(c˜, c˜′) :
(pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ); (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ); r, r′←$R
c = Enc(pk ,m; r); c′ = Enc(pk ′,m′; r′)
aux := (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′,m′); (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux)
 . (3)
Alternative formulations. A particular case is the one where the distribution of ciphertexts
using independent randomness or shared randomness are directly statistically close. Such a
requirement is more stringent, and can be cast in Definition 5 by requiring that Rand simply
outputs the pair (c, c′).
Yet another variation of the above property has been considered by Bellare et al. [BBS03]
in their study of randomness re-use in multi-recipient PKE. The reproducibility test of [BBS03]
can be cast in Definition 5 by requiring that Dm,m′ and D˜m,m′ are identically distributed, and
moreover Rand can produce the pair (c˜, c˜′) without knowing the randomness r′ (corresponding
to ciphertext c′).
Our choice to go for the formulation above is due to the fact that Definition 5 is a weaker
requirement, yet it is sufficient to prove security of our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm.
3.3 Main Theorem: KDM Security
We now turn to state our main theorem, which quantifies the security of our twist of the
Naor-Yung paradigm.
Theorem 1 (Main theorem, KDM security). Let Π be a PKE scheme satisfying F-KDM-CPA
security and with the randomness fusion property (cf. Definition 5), and let (PH ,VH) be a
simulation-sound NIZK for the language LΠNY of Eq. (1). Then, the PKE scheme Π
∗ described
in Fig. 3 satisfies F-KDM-CCA security in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider a series of games, where the initial game is identical to the KDM-CCA
experiment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the KDM-CCA experiment
with b = 0. Hence, we show that the games are computationally indistinguishable unless one of
the assumptions in the theorem statement is violated. This implies the theorem.
Game G0: This game is identical to the KDM-CCA experiment for Π
∗, with hidden bit b = 1.
In particular, this means that the adversary has access to oracle Okdmsk∗,1(·) which, upon
input a query f ∈ F , returns the same as Enc∗(pk∗, f(sk)). Recall that oracle Odecsk∗(·),
upon input a ciphertext c∗ := (c, c′, pi), first checks that VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 1; hence
it returns the same as Dec(sk , c).
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Game G1: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the proof pi attached
to each ciphertext is now computed by running the zero-knowledge simulator, as in
(pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c, c′)). Furthermore, algorithm S(1, τ, ·) is used to answer ran-
dom oracle queries.
Game G2: This game is identical to the previous game, except the way ciphertexts c
∗ (returned
by the KDM oracle) are computed. Namely, instead of computing c and c′ using the
same randomness r∗←$R we now sample r, r′←$R, let c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r) and c′ =
Enc(pk ′, f(sk); r′), and finally re-randomize (c, c′) by running Rand((c, c′), aux) with aux =
(pk , pk ′, sk , r, f(sk)). Note that the attached simulated proof pi is now a proof of a false
statement (because the two ciphertexts use independent randomness).
Game G3: This game is identical to the previous game, except the way ciphertexts c
∗ (returned
by the KDM oracle) are computed. Namely, we now let c′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ; r′).
Game G4: This game is identical to the previous game, except the way decryption queries are
answered. Upon input a decryption query c∗ = (c, c′, pi), we first verify the proof pi (as
before), but we now return the same as Dec(sk ′, c′) in case the proof is accepting.
Game G5: This game is different from the previous game in that we update the auxiliary
information used by algorithm Rand, i.e. we let aux = (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′, 0µ).
Game G6: In this game we compute the ciphertext c (pertaining to a query to the KDM
oracle) as an encryption of 0µ, i.e. c = Enc(pk , 0µ; r) for r←$R.
Game G7: This game is different from the previous game in that we do not run algorithm
Rand in the KDM oracle anymore. Namely, ciphertexts c and c′ are now computed again
using the same random coins r∗←$R, and thus the proof pi is for a true statement.
Game G8: The proof pi computed in each query to the KDM oracle is now computed using the
real prover algorithm, as in pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), (0µ, r∗)). Furthermore, random oracle
queries are answered using the random oracle H.
Game G9: This game is identical to the previous game, except that decryption queries for
which the proof pi is accepting are now answered returning the same as Dec(sk , c). Note
that this yields a distribution identical to the one in the KDM-CCA experiment for Π∗,
with hidden bit b = 0.
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 1. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν0,1 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G0 = 1]− P [G1 = 1]| ≤ ν0,1(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that the only difference between G0 and G1 is that the proofs pi cor-
responding to each query to the KDM oracle are computed by running the real prover (with
witness (f(sk), r∗)) in the former game, and the zero-knowledge simulator in the latter game.
Also note that in game G1 the queries to the random oracle are simulated consistently, i.e.
by running S(1, τ, ·). Thus, the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge
property of (PH ,VH) (cf. Definition 3).
Claim 2. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G1 = 1]− P [G2 = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G2 and G1 is that in the former algorithm Rand is
run in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) in each query to the KDM oracle. In
other words, the pair (c, c′) corresponding to each ciphertext c∗ computed inside the KDM oracle
is sampled from the distribution Df(sk),f(sk) in game G1 and from the distribution D˜f(sk),f(sk)
in G2, where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). By the randomness
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fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5) we know that Df(sk),f(sk) and D˜f(sk),f(sk)
are statistically close, and so must be G1 and G2.
Claim 3. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p2,3(·) such that for
infinitely many values of λ ∈ N we have |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≥ 1/p2,3(λ). We construct a
PPT adversary A′ breaking CPA security (and thus Fmsg-KDM-CPA security, see Section 2.2)
of Π, as follows.
• Receive pk ′ from the challenger, sample (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the KDM oracle, let m¯ := f(sk) and forward fm¯ ∈ Fmsg to the
target KDM oracle receiving back a ciphertext c′ (computed using fresh coins r′←$R);
compute c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r) using fresh coins r←$R, run (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′,
sk , r, f(sk))), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)), and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as it would
be done in both G2 and G3 (i.e., decrypt c using sk after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
We note that the above simulation is perfect. Namely, depending on A′’s target oracle being
initialized with hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0 we obtain exactly the same distribution as in game
G2 or G3. Hence A
′ retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 4. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν3,4 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G3 = 1]− P [G4 = 1]| ≤ ν3,4(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Define the
following event E in the probability space of game G4: The event becomes true whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
Notice that the distributions of G3 and G4 are identical conditioned on event E not happening,
hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p3,4(·), such that for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N adversary A provokes event E (in game G4) with probability at least
1/p3,4(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a query f ∈ F to the KDM oracle, compute the pair of ciphertexts (c˜, c˜′)
as it would be done in game G4, i.e. let c = Enc(pk , f(sk); r), c
′ = Enc(pk ′, 0µ; r′), and
(c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux). Hence, forward the statement (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′) to the target sim-
ulation oracle obtaining a proof pi, and return c∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Answer A’s queries to the decryption oracle as it would be done in game G4; note that
this can be done because the reduction knows the secret key sk ′.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VS(1,τ,·)((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Observe that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. This means that A will provoke event E
with probability 1/p3,4(λ), and hence A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
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Claim 5. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν4,5 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G4 = 1]− P [G5 = 1]| ≤ ν4,5(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G4 and G5 lies on the auxiliary information upon
which algorithm Rand is run. Define the hybrid game G4.5, where instead of running algorithm
Rand the ciphertexts (c, c′) corresponding to each query to the KDM oracle are sampled from the
distribution D˜f(sk),0µ of Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion property we get G4 ≈s G4.5 ≈s G5,
which implies the claim.
Claim 6. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν5,6 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G5 = 1]− P [G6 = 1]| ≤ ν5,6(λ).
Proof of claim. We prove indistinguishability of the two games down to the F-KDM-CPA se-
curity of Π. In particular, assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p5,6(·)
such that, for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G5 = 1] − P [G6 = 1]| ≥ 1/p5,6(λ).
Consider the following PPT adversary A′ attacking F-KDM-CPA security of Π.
• Receive pk from the challenger, sample (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the KDM oracle, forward f to the target KDM oracle receiving
back a ciphertext c (computed using fresh coins r←$R); compute c′ = Enc(pk , 0µ; r′) us-
ing fresh coins r′←$R, run (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′, 0µ)), simulate the proof
pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)), and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as it would
be done in both G5 and G6 (i.e., decrypt c
′ using sk ′ after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
We note that the above simulation is perfect. Namely, depending on A′’s target KDM oracle
being initialized with hidden bit b = 1 or b = 0 we obtain exactly the same distribution as in
game G5 or G6. Hence A
′ retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 7. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν6,7 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G6 = 1]− P [G7 = 1]| ≤ ν6,7(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G6 and G7 is that in the former algorithm Rand is
run in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) in each query to the KDM oracle. In
other words, the pair (c, c′) corresponding to each ciphertext c∗ computed inside the KDM oracle
is sampled from the distribution D0µ,0µ in game G7 and from the distribution D˜0µ,0µ in G6,
where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion
property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5) we know that D0µ,0µ and D˜0µ,0µ are statistically
close, and so must be G6 and G7.
Claim 8. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν7,8 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G7 = 1]− P [G8 = 1]| ≤ ν7,8(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that the only difference between G7 and G8 is that the proofs pi cor-
responding to each query to the KDM oracle are computed by running the real prover (with
witness (0µ, r∗)) in the latter game, and the zero-knowledge simulator in the former game. Also
note that in game G8 the queries to the random oracle are evaluated consistently, i.e. by run-
ning H(·). Thus, the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of
(PH ,VH) (cf. Definition 3).
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Claim 9. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν8,9 : N→ [0, 1] such that
|P [G8 = 1]− P [G9 = 1]| ≤ ν8,9(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK.3 Define the
following event E in the probability space of game G9: The event becomes true whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
Notice that the distributions of G8 and G9 are identical conditioned on event E not happening,
hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p8,9(·), such that for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N adversary A provokes event E (in game G9) with probability at least
1/p8,9(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Answer A’s queries to the KDM and decryption oracles as it would be done in game G9;
note that this can be done because the reduction knows the secret key sk and moreover
it can run the real prover in order to obtain the proof pi (which is always for a true
statement).
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VH((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Observe that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. This means that A will provoke event E
with probability 1/p8,9(λ), and hence A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Remark 1. While we did not write this explicitly, we stress that the KDM functions f ∈ F
can depend on the random oracle H. However, as originally argued in [FKMV12], since the
random oracle is only invoked on public data, this dependency does not affect the above proof.
3.4 Main Theorem: Key-Leakage Security
As proven in [NS09, FKMV12] the classical Naor-Yung paradigm allows to boost CPA security
under Λ-key-leakage attacks to CCA security under Λ-key-leakage attacks. A similar result
holds for our twist of the Naor-Yung construction, assuming the underlying PKE scheme meets
the randomness fusion property.
Theorem 2 (Main theorem, key-leakage security). Let Π be a PKE scheme satisfying Λ-LKG-
CPA security and with the randomness fusion property (cf. Definition 5), and let (PH ,VH) be a
simulation-sound NIZK for the language LΠNY of Eq. (1). Then, the PKE scheme Π
∗ described
in Fig. 3 satisfies Λ-LKG-CCA security in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider a series of games, where the initial game is identical to the LKG-CCA ex-
periment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the LKG-CCA experiment with
b = 0. Their outcomes cannot be mutually distinguished, as long as the theorem’s hypothesis
are not violated.
3Actually soundness is already sufficient for this step of the proof, i.e. the reduction below does not need to
make any oracle query to the zero-knowledge simulator.
13
Game G0: This game is identical to the LKG-CCA experiment for Π
∗, with hidden bit b = 1.
In particular, this means that the challenge ciphertext c1 := (c, c
′, pi) contains encryptions
c and c′ of the same plaintext m1. Recall that oracle Odecsk∗(·), upon input a ciphertext
c∗ := (c, c′, pi), first checks that VH((pk , pk ′, c, c′), pi) = 1; hence it returns the same as
Dec(sk , c).
Game G1: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the proof pi attached
to each ciphertext is now computed by running the zero-knowledge simulator, as in
(pi, τ)←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c, c′)). Furthermore, algorithm S(1, τ, ·) is used to answer ran-
dom oracle queries.
Game G2: This game is identical to the previous game, except the way the challenge ciphertext
c1 := (c, c
′, pi) is computed. Namely, instead of computing c and c′ using the same random-
ness r∗←$R, we now sample r, r′←$R, let c = Enc(pk ,m1; r), c′ = Enc(pk ′,m1; r′), and
finally re-randomize (c, c′) by running Rand((c, c′), aux), with aux = (pk , pk ′, sk , r,m1).
Note that the attached simulated proof pi is now a proof of a false statement (because the
two ciphertexts use independent randomness).
Game G3: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the ciphertext c
′ contained
in the challenge ciphertext is now computed as c′ = Enc(pk ′,m0; r′).
Game G4: This game is identical to the previous game, except the way decryption queries are
answered. Upon input a decryption query c∗ := (c, c′, pi), we first verify the proof pi (as
before) but we now return the same as Dec(sk′, c′) in case the proof is accepting.
Game G5: This game is different from the previous game in that we update the auxiliary
information used by algorithm Rand, i.e. we let aux = (pk, pk′, sk′, r′,m0).
Game G6: In this game we compute the ciphertex c within the challenge ciphertext as an
encryption of m0, i.e., c = Enc(pk ,m0; r) for r←$R.
Game G7: This game is identical to the previous game, except that we do not run algorithm
Rand anymore for generating the challenge ciphertext. Namely, ciphertexts c and c′ are
now computed again using the same random coins r∗←$R, and thus the proof pi is for a
true statement.
Game G8: The proof pi within the challenge ciphertext is now computed by running the real
prover algorithm, as in pi←$ PH((pk , pk ′, c′, c′), (m0, r∗)). Furthermore, random oracle
queries are answered using the random oracle H.
Game G9: This game is identical to the previous game, except that decryption queries for
which the proof pi is accepting are now answered via Dec(sk , c). Note that this yields a
distribution identical to that of the LKG-CCA experiment for Π∗, with hidden bit b = 0.
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 10. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν0,1 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G0 = 1]− P [G1 = 1]| ≤ ν0,1(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that the only difference between G0 and G1 is that the proof pi within
the challenge ciphertext is computed by running the real prover (with witness (m1, r
∗)) in the
former game, and the zero-knowledge simulator in the latter game. Also note that in game
G1 the queries to the random oracle are simulated consistently, i.e. by running S(1, τ, ·). Thus,
the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH) (cf.
Definition 3).
Claim 11. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G1 = 1]− P [G2 = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
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Proof of claim. The only difference between G2 and G1 is that in the former algorithm Rand
is run in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) within the challenge ciphertext. In
other words, the pair (c, c′) is sampled from the distribution Dm1,m1 in game G1 and from the
distribution D˜m1,m1 in G2, where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).
By the randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5) we know that Dm1,m1
and D˜m1,m1 are statistically close, and so must be G1 and G2.
Claim 12. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p2,3(·) such that for
infinitely many values of λ ∈ N we have |P [G2 = 1]− P [G3 = 1]| ≥ 1/p2,3(λ). We construct a
PPT adversary A′ breaking CPA security (and thus 0-LKG-CPA security) of Π, as follows.
• Receive pk ′ from the challenger, sample (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the leakage oracle, answer with f(sk). Note that this can be
done as A′ knows the secret key sk .
• When A outputs m0 and m1, forward (m0,m1) to the challenger obtaining a ciphertext
c′ (which is either an encryption of m1 or an encryption of m0 under pk ′, using fresh
coins r′←$R). Hence, compute c = Enc(pk ,m1; r) using fresh random coins r←$R, run
(c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk , r,m1)), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)),
and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as it would
be done in both G2 and G3 (i.e., decrypt c using sk after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
We note that the above simulation is perfect. Namely, depending on A′’s challenger using hidden
bit b = 1 or b = 0 we obtain exactly the same distribution as in game G2 or G3. Hence A
′
retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 13. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν3,4 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G3 = 1]− P [G4 = 1]| ≤ ν3,4(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Define the
following event E in the probability space of game G4: The event becomes true whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
Notice that the distributions of G3 and G4 are identical conditioned on event E not happening,
hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p3,4(·), such that for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N adversary A provokes event E (in game G4) with probability at least
1/p3,4(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a leakage query f , answer with f(sk). Note that this can be done as A′ knows
the secret key sk .
• When A ouputs (m0,m1) compute the pair of ciphertexts (c˜, c˜′) as it would be done in
game G4, i.e. let c = Enc(pk ,m1; r), c
′ = Enc(pk ′,m0; r′), and (c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), aux).
Hence, forward the statement (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′) to the target simulation oracle obtaining a
proof pi, and return c∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
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• Answer A’s queries to the decryption oracle as it would be done in game G4; note that
this can be done because the reduction knows the secret key sk ′.
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VS(1,τ,·)((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Observe that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. This means that A will provoke event E
with probability 1/p3,4(λ), and hence A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Claim 14. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν4,5 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G4 = 1]− P [G5 = 1]| ≤ ν4,5(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G4 and G5 lies on the auxiliary information upon
which algorithm Rand is run. Define the hybrid game G4.5, where instead of running algorithm
Rand the ciphertexts (c, c′) corresponding to the challenge ciphertext are sampled from the
distribution D˜m1,m0 of Eq. (3). By the randomness fusion property we get G4 ≈s G4.5 ≈s G5,
which implies the claim.
Claim 15. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν5,6 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G5 = 1]− P [G6 = 1]| ≤ ν5,6(λ).
Proof of claim. We prove indistinguishability of the two games down to the Λ-LKG-CPA se-
curity of Π. In particular, assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p5,6(·)
such that, for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, we have |P [G5 = 1] − P [G6 = 1]| ≥ 1/p5,6(λ).
Consider the following PPT adversary A′ attacking Λ-KDM-CPA security of Π.
• Receive pk from the challenger, sample (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′)
to A.
• Upon input a query f to the leakage oracle, forward f to the target leakage oracle and
return the corresponding output to A.
• Whenever A outputs (m0,m1), forward (m0,m1) to the challenger obtaining a ciphertext c
(which is either an encryption ofm0 or an encryption ofm1 under public key pk , using fresh
random coins r←$R). Hence, compute c′ = Enc(pk ,m0; r′) using fresh coins r′←$R, run
(c˜, c˜′)←$ Rand((c, c′), (pk , pk ′, sk ′, r′,m0)), simulate the proof pi←$ S(2, τ, (pk , pk ′, c˜, c˜′)),
and return c˜∗ = (c˜, c˜′, pi) to A.
• Upon input a query c∗ = (c, c′, pi) to the decryption oracle, answer this query as it would
be done in both G5 and G6 (i.e., decrypt c
′ using sk ′ after verifying the proof pi).
• Return the same guess as that of A.
We note that the above simulation is perfect. Namely, depending on A′’s challenger using hidden
bit b = 1 or b = 0 we obtain exactly the same distribution as in game G5 or G6. Hence A
′
retains the same advantage as A. The claim follows.
Claim 16. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν6,7 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G6 = 1]− P [G7 = 1]| ≤ ν6,7(λ).
Proof of claim. The only difference between G6 and G7 is that in the former algorithm Rand
is run in order to re-randomize the pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) within the challenge ciphertext. In
other words, the pair (c, c′) is sampled from the distribution Dm0,m0 in game G7 and from the
distribution D˜m0,m0 in G6, where the distributions D and D˜ are defined in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).
By the randomness fusion property of the PKE scheme (cf. Definition 5) we know that Dm0,m0
and D˜m0,m0 are statistically close, and so must be G6 and G7.
16
Claim 17. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν7,8 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G7 = 1]− P [G8 = 1]| ≤ ν7,8(λ).
Proof of claim. Notice that the only difference between G7 and G8 is that the proof pi cor-
responding to the challenge ciphertext is computed by running the real prover (with witness
(m0, r
∗)) in the latter game, and the zero-knowledge simulator in the former game. Also note
that in game G8 the queries to the random oracle are evaluated consistently, i.e. by runningH(·).
Thus, the claim follows readily from the non-interactive zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH)
(cf. Definition 3).
Claim 18. For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν8,9 : N → [0, 1] such
that |P [G8 = 1]− P [G9 = 1]| ≤ ν8,9(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof is down to the simulation soundness property of the NIZK. Define the
following event E in the probability space of game G9: The event becomes true whenever there
exists a decryption query c∗i = (ci, c
′
i, pi
′
i) such that pi
′
i is accepting but Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i).
Notice that the distributions of G8 and G9 are identical conditioned on event E not happening,
hence, by a standard argument, it suffices to bound the probability that event E happens.
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p8,9(·), such that for infinitely
many values of λ ∈ N adversary A provokes event E (in game G9) with probability at least
1/p8,9(λ). We construct a PPT adversary A
′ attacking simulation soundness of (PH ,VH), as
follows.
• Run (pk , sk)←$ Gen(1λ), (pk ′, sk ′)←$ Gen(1λ), and return pk∗ = (pk , pk ′) to A.
• Upon input a leakage query f from A, answer with f(sk). Note that this can be done as
A′ knows the secret key sk .
• Whenever A outputs (m0,m1), compute the challenge ciphertext c∗ = (c, c′, pi) as it would
be done in G9. Note that this can be done as A
′ can run the real prover in order to obtain
the proof pi (which is always for a true statement).
• Let (c1, c′1, pi1), . . . , (cq, c′q, piq) be the list of A’s decryption queries. Find an index i ∈ [q]
such that VH((pk , pk ′, ci, c′i), pii) = 1 and Dec(sk , ci) 6= Dec(sk ′, c′i); return ((pk , pk ′, ci,
c′i), pii).
Observe that the simulation done by A′ is perfect. This means that A will provoke event E
with probability 1/p8,9(λ), and hence A
′ breaks simulation soundness with the same probability.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Remark 2. While we did not write this explicitly, we stress that in the above proof the leakage
functions can depend on the random oracle H. See also Remark 1.
4 KDM Security from Subset Sum
We start by recalling the Subset Sum assumption in Section 4.1. Our new Subset-Sum based
PKE scheme is described in Section 4.2, and its correctness and security are showed in Section 4.3
and Section 4.4, respectively.
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4.1 The Subset Sum Problem
In its simplest form, the search version of the Subset Sum problem—denoted SS(n, q) and
parameterized by values n(λ), q(λ) ∈ N—asks to compute a secret vector s given (a, t) such
that t := 〈a, s〉 mod q, where both a ∈ Znq and s ∈ {0, 1}n are randomly chosen. The decisional
version of the problem, instead, asks to distinguish (a, t) from (a, u) where u is uniform in Zq.
The equivalence between the search and the decisional version of the Subset Sum problem has
been established in a seminal paper by Impagliazzo and Naor [IN96].
Below, we recall a variant of the Subset Sum problem which was considered for the first
time by Lyubashevsky, Palacio and Segev [LPS10]. Here the modulus q is a power of an odd
number; in our case we will set q := pm, for some m ∈ N. Such a variant of the problem helps
interpreting the Subset Sum problem as an instance of the Learning with Errors [Reg05, Reg09]
(LWE) problem with “deterministic noise”, as we recall below.
Definition 6 (Subset Sum assumption). For security parameter λ ∈ N, and parameters n(λ),
p(λ), m(λ) ∈ N, consider the following distribution DSS(λ, n, p,m):
• Sample A←$ Zm×np and s←$ {0, 1}n.
• Parse A := (a1,1, . . . , am,n), s := (s1, . . . , sn), compute A · s ∈ Znp , and let e1(A, s) := 0.
For all j ∈ [m], j 6= 1, compute
ej(A, s) :=
⌊
ej−1(A, s) +
∑n
i=1 aj−1,i
p
⌋
mod p.
• Set e(A, s) := (em(A, s), . . . , e1(A, s))T and t := A · s + e(A, s). Output (A, t, s).
We say that the decisional Subset Sum assumption SS(n, pm) holds, if for all PPT distinguishers
D there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that∣∣P [D(A, t) = 1 : (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m)]− P [D(A,u) = 1 : (A,u)←$ Zm×np × Zmp ]∣∣ ≤ ν(λ).
Once again, it can be shown that the above decisional version of Subset Sum is equivalent to
the search version (i.e., to finding s). In fact, [LPS10] showed that the representation (A, t) ∈
Zm×np ×Zmp of Subset Sum is equivalent to the original representation (a, t) ∈ Znq ×Zq, whenever
q = pm and p ≥ 2√n log n + 3. In particular, given a := (a1, . . . , an) and s := (s1, . . . , sn),
the matrix A := (a1,1, . . . , am,n) can be defined as follows. For i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], let
aj,i := b aipj−1 c mod p, and interpret the vector e(A, s) as the vector of carries in the computation
of t :=
∑n
i=1 si · ai mod pm. This way, the value t directly corresponds to n∑
i=1
si
am,i...
a1,i

+
em(A, s)...
e0(A, s)
 = t,
as desired.
Therefore, Subset Sum can be seen as LWE with deterministic noise e(A, s) which only
depends on A and s. An important difference between Subset Sum and LWE is that for LWE
the value m can be arbitrarily large as long as it remains polynomial. Instead, for Subset Sum
the density δ := n/ log q = n/(m log p) decreases with the size of m; this implies that Subset
Sum can be solved efficiently for m ≈ n2. However, the problem is considered to be hard
whenever δ ∈ O(1/ log n).
The following lemma, which can be easily derived from [LPS10, Lemma 3.4], states that
the deterministic noise e(A, s) is small, and additionally it remains small when multiplied by a
matrix R with components of bounded size.
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Lemma 1 ([LPS10]). For security parameter λ ∈ N, and parameters n(λ), p(λ), m(λ), `(λ) ∈
N, let `,m ∈ poly(λ) and p be a prime such that p ≥ 2√n log n+3. Let (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m)
and R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m. There exist negligible functions ν, ν ′ : N→ [0, 1] such that
P
[‖e(A, s)‖∞ < √n log n+ 1] ≥ 1− ν(λ)
P
[‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ < √pmn log2 n+ n√p] ≥ 1− ν ′(λ). (4)
Leftover hash lemma. Let H := {h : D → I} be a family of hash functions with domain D
and image I. Recall that H is called universal if for any x ∈ D and x′ ∈ D the following holds:
P
h←$H
[
h(x) = h(x′)
]
=
1
|I| .
The celebrated leftover hash lemma [HILL99, AP11] states that, over the random choice of
h←$H, x←$D, and u←$ I, the statistical distance between (h, h(x)) and (h, u) is smaller
than 1/2
√|I|/|D|.
It is easy to show that matrices in Zm×np are a family of universal hash functions for prime
p and any domain D ⊆ Zmp . As a consequence, we obtain the following lemma which will be
important for showing security of our PKE scheme.
Lemma 2. For prime p and values n,m, ` ∈ N, let A←$ Zm×np , u1,u2←$ Zmp , R←$ [−b
√
p/2c,
b√p/2c]`×m, and B←$ Z`×(n+2)p . Then,
∆ ((A,u1,u2,RA,Ru1,Ru2); (A,u1,u2,B)) ≤ `
2
4
√
22(n+2) log p−m log(p−2).
Proof. SinceH := Zm×(n+2)p is a family of universal hash functions withD := [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]m
and I := Zn+2p , the statement follows directly by the leftover hash lemma and the triangle in-
equality (via a standard hybrid argument).
4.2 Scheme Description
We now describe a PKE scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec), with message space M = {0, 1}` for an
arbitrary polynomial `(·). The scheme depends on the Subset Sum distribution of Definition 6,
with parameters n, p, m ∈ N.
Key Generation: Upon input the security parameter λ ∈ N, the randomized key generation
algorithm Gen samples (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m) and defines pk := (A, t) and sk := s.
Encryption: Upon input a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1}` and the public key pk := (A, t), the ran-
domized encryption algorithm Enc picks a random matrix R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m
and returns C := (A′, t′ + m · bp2c) such that A′ := R ·A, t′ := R · t, and m ∈ Z`2 is the
vector representation of the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1}`.
Decryption: Upon input the secret key sk := s and a ciphertext C := (C1, c2), the determin-
istic decryption algorithm Dec returns bc2 −C1 · se2 ∈ {0, 1}`.
4.3 Proof of Correctness
The theorem below states that the above defined PKE scheme meets the correctness require-
ment, i.e. decryption of honestly computed ciphertexts yields the corresponding plaintext.
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Theorem 3 (Correctness of PKE scheme). Let n, p, q ∈ N be parameters such that p is a prime,
p ≥ 25mn log4 n, n ≥ 10, m ∈ Θ(n), and ` ∈ O(nk) for some constant k ∈ N. Then, the PKE
scheme of Section 4.2 satisfies correctness.
Further, correctness holds for ciphertexts of the form C := (A′, t′ + m ◦ bξ/2c), for any
vector ξ ∈ [p− n− 1, p]`, and where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product.
Proof. We prove directly the second part of the statement, as it implies the first part. The
decryption algorithm computes
bc2 −C1 · se2 = bt′ + m ◦ bξ/2c −A′ · se2 = bR · t + m ◦ bξ/2c −R ·A · se2
= bR(A · s + e(A, s)) + m ◦ bξ/2c −R ·A · se2
= bR · e(A, s) + m ◦ bξ/2ce2,
where the third equality comes from the definition of the Subset Sum distribution. Finally, for
parameters m,n, p as in the theorem statement, by using the bound of Eq. (4) from Lemma 1,
with overwhelming probability over the choice of pk , sk ,R, we obtain that ‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ is
smaller than
√
pmn log2 n+ n
√
p. By choosing p ≥ 25mn log4 n and n ≥ 10,
‖R · e(A, s)‖∞ < bp/4c − b(n+ 1)/2 + 1c ≤ bp/4c − ‖bξ′/2 + 1c‖∞
holds for ξ′ ∈ [0, n+ 1]` and thus
bR · e(A, s) + m ◦ bξ/2ce2 = b(R · e(A, s)−m ◦ bξ′/2 + 1c+ mbp/2c)bp/2c−1e
= b(R · e(A, s)−m ◦ bξ′/2 + 1c) · bp/2c−1e+ bme = m.
4.4 Proof of Security
We now prove that our PKE scheme satisfies a form of KDM security, as formalized in the
theorem below. The set of manipulations tolerated by the scheme consists of the set of all affine
functions of the form
Faff := {f : f(s) := F · s + f}F∈Z`×n2 ,f∈Z`2 .
We remark that a generic amplification theorem by Applebaum [App11, App14] allows to boost
Faff -KDM-CPA security to G-KDM-CPA security, where G consists of the family of functions
that can computed in some fixed polynomial time (or the set of all polynomial-size circuits
whose size grows with their input and output lengths via a fixed polynomial rate).
For technical reasons, we need that when encrypting a function of the secret key, the ci-
phertext has a slightly different form. Namely, c′2 := t′ +
(
F · ⌊p2⌋) · s + bp2c · f instead of
c2 := t
′+(F ·s+ f)bp2c. This can be easily done by the encryption algorithm whenever F, f and
s is known. Furthermore, c′2 and c2 decrypt to the same value. This can be seen by noticing
that bp2c = p−12 , the multiplication with s and addition with f is for each component the sum of
at most n+ 1 values p−12 modulo p, and hence c
′
2 is a ciphertext of the form c
′
2 = t
′ + bξ2c ◦m
for some ξ ∈ [p− n− 1, p]` (cf. Theorem 3).
The reason for this obstacle is that we need to map the function f , which lives in Z2, into Zp.
Since p is prime, it does not have a subgroup of size 2 to which we could map the components
of F and f . Therefore we need to map them to either p−12 (when 1) or to 0 (when 0). Since
we do not map them to a subgroup, the output of f will also not be in a subgroup, but within
range [p−n−1, p] (when 1) or [−n−1, 0] (when 0). One could resolve this obstacle by choosing
p even, but then the leftover-hash lemma does only apply for a matrix R with components in
{0, 1}, such that m needs to be larger. This would decrease the density of the underlying Subset
Sum instance to 1/ log2(n). Therefore, we prefer our approach.
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Theorem 4 (KDM security of PKE scheme). Let n, p, q ∈ N be parameters such that p is a
prime, p ≥ 25mn log4 n, m ∈ Θ(n), and ` ∈ O(nk) for some constant k ∈ N. If the SS(n, pm)
assumption holds (achieved with density δ ∈ Θ(1/ log n)), then the PKE scheme Π from Sec-
tion 4.2 satisfies Faff-KDM-CPA security.
Proof. We consider a series of games, where the initial game is identical to the KDM-CPA
experiment with hidden bit b = 1 and the last game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment
with b = 0. Hence, we show that the games are computationally indistinguishable unless one of
the assumptions in the theorem statement is violated. This implies the theorem.
Game G0: This game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment for the PKE scheme Π of
Section 4.2, with hidden bit b = 1. In particular, this means that the adversary has
access to oracle Okdms,1 (·) which, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , returns a ciphertext
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s +
⌊p
2
⌋
· f ,
where R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m, and (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m).
Game G1: We change the way queries to the KDM oracle are answered. Namely, upon input
a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , we now return a ciphertext C := (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · t + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Game G2: We change the distribution of the public key. Namely, instead of having sk = s
and pk = (A, t) where (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m), we now have sk = s and pk = (A,u)
where (A,u)←$ Zm×np ×Zmp and (as before) s←$ {0, 1}n. Queries to the KDM oracle are
answered as in the previous game. Namely, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , we now
return a ciphertext C := (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Game G3: This game is identical to the KDM-CPA experiment for the PKE scheme Π of
Section 4.2, with hidden bit b = 0. In particular, this means that the adversary has
access to oracle Okdms,0 (·) which, upon input a query (F, f) ∈ Faff , returns a ciphertext
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t,
where R←$ [−b√p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m, and (A, t, s)←$ DSS(λ, n, p,m).
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the above defined games.
Claim 19. G0 ≈s G1.
Proof of claim. The proof is a consequence of leftover-hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2). In fact,
basing on that lemma, for C = (C1, c2) computed by G0 with
C1 := R ·A c2 := R · t +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
and C ′ = (C′1, c′2) computed by G1 where
C′1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c′2 := R · t + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
21
we have that there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆ ((C1,Re(A, s)); (U,Re(A, s))) ≤ ν(λ) and ∆
(
(C′1,Re(A, s)); (U,Re(A, s))
) ≤ ν(λ),
where U←$ Z`×np . Conditioned on C1, C′1, Re(A, s), both c2 and c′2 are uniquely determined:
c2 = C1s + Re(A, s) +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c′2 = C
′
1s + Re(A, s) +
(
F ·
⌊p
2
⌋)
· s + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
.
Therefore c2 and c
′
2 have the same distribution and we obtain that
∆((C1, c2), (C
′
1, c
′
2)) ≤ 2ν(λ),
so G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
Claim 20. For all PPT distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function ν1,2 : N→ [0, 1] such
that |P [D(G1(λ)) = 1]− P [D(G2(λ)) = 1]| ≤ ν1,2(λ).
Proof of claim. Assume there exists a PPT distinguisher D and a polynomial p1,2(·), such that,
for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, distinguisher D tells apart G1 and G2 with probability at
least 1/p1,2(λ). We build a PPT distinguisher D
′ that breaks the Subset Sum assumption with
the same probability, i.e. D′ is given a pair (A, t) as input and is able to distinguish whether this
pair was sampled from the Subset Sum distribution DSS(λ, n, p,m) or uniformly at random. A
complete description of D′(A, t) follows below.
• Set pk := (A, t), and forward pk to D.
• Upon input a query (F, f) to the KDM oracle from D, answer this query as it would be
done both in G1 and G2. Namely, let C1 := R ·A + Fbp/2c, c2 := R · t + fbp/2c, and
return C = (C1, c2) to D. Note that this is possible because in both games the answer to
KDM queries can be generated without knowing the secret key.
• Return the guess of D.
For the analysis, note that D′ perfectly simulates the view of D. In fact, depending on the
public key being Subset Sum distributed or uniformly distributed, the view of D′ is identical to
either the view in G1 or the view in G2. Thus, D
′ retains the same advantage of D, concluding
the proof.
Claim 21. For all PPT distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function ν2,3 : N→ [0, 1] such
that |P [D(G2(λ)) = 1]− P [D(G3(λ)) = 1]| ≤ ν2,3(λ).
Proof of claim. The proof of indistinguishability between G2 and G3 follows from the leftover-
hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2) and the Subset Sum assumption. Game G2 computes ciphertexts
C = (C1, c2) such that
C1 := R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
c2 := R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
,
whereas G3 computes C
′ = (C′1, c′2) with
C′1 := R ·A c′2 := R · t.
By Lemma 2 we have that there exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆ ((C1,Ru); (U,Ru)) ≤ ν(λ) and ∆
(
(C′1,Ru); (U,Ru)
) ≤ ν(λ),
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where U←$ Z`×np and u←$ Zmp . Furthermore, the components F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
and f · ⌊p2⌋—where
F ∈ Z`×np and f ∈ Z`p—represent only a translation for C1 and c2, so we have:
C1 = R ·A− F ·
⌊p
2
⌋
≈s R ·A = C′1 c2 = R · u + f ·
⌊p
2
⌋
≈s R · u.
Therefore, the indistinguishability between the distributions (C1, c2) and (C
′
1, c
′
2) follows from
those approximations and the Subset Sum assumption, whereby ((R · A), (R · u)) ≈c ((R ·
A), (R · t)), which implies the statement.
5 Concrete Instantiations and Comparisons
In this section we showcase the efficiency improvement due to the adoption of our twist of
the Naor-Yung paradigm, when we instantiate the (ROM based) NIZK in the corresponding
language using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] applied to so-called Sigma-protocols.
Sigma-protocols. Let L be an NP language, with corresponding relation R, and let (P,V)
be an interactive argument system for L. We say that Σ = (P,V) is a Sigma-protocol if its
transcripts consist of three messages (α, β, γ), with the first message sent by the prover, and
with β being the random coin tosses of the verifier. Typically, a Sigma-protocol satisfies the
following properties.
Completeness: Transcripts (α, β, γ) generated by a honest prover are accepted by the verifier
with overwhelming probability.
Special Soundness: Given two accepting transcripts (α, β, γ) and (α, β′, γ′) for a given state-
ment y ∈ L, with β 6= β′, it is possible to extract in polynomial time a value x such that
(y, x) ∈ R.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator that, upon input some
y ∈ L, outputs transcripts (α, β, γ) that are computationally indistinguishable from honest
transcripts resulting from interactions between P and V on common input y.
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic transforms a Sigma-protocol with the above properties into a NIZK
argument system, using a hash function H modeled as a random oracle; the main idea is that
the prover emulates the verifier by setting β := H(α||y). As proven in [FKMV12, Theorem
2], the above transformation yields a simulation-sound NIZK in the random oracle model,
provided that Σ satisfies an additional property known as “quasi-unique responses” (a.k.a.
strict soundness [Unr12]): No PPT adversary should be able to output a statement y ∈ L
together with two accepting proofs (α, β, γ) and (α, β, γ′) such that γ 6= γ′.
PKE Scheme Security Standard NY Ours Assumption
BHHO08 [BHHO08] KDM/LKG 4`+ 5 2`+ 4 DDH
BG10 [BG10] KDM/LKG 4`+ 5 2`+ 4 QR
Table 1: Comparing two instantiations of our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm under the DDH
and QR assumptions. KDM and LKG stand for CCA security under key-dependent message and key-
leakage attacks, respectively. The third and forth columns contain the ciphertext size expressed in group
elements or exponents, for the standard Naor-Yung construction and our modified version (respectively).
All instantiations are in the random oracle model.
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Evaluation. Summarizing the above discussion, to instantiate the NIZK argument in our
twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm in the random oracle model, it suffices to give a Sigma-protocol
with the properties discussed above, for the language defined in Eq. (1).
Table 1 compares two instantiations of our scheme w.r.t. the original Naor-Yung paradigm,
based on two different complexity assumptions: Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Quadratic
Residuosity (QR). We make the comparison for both cases of CCA security under key-dependent
message and key-leakage attacks. The description of the corresponding Sigma-protocols can be
found in the following subsections, where we additionally describe an instantiation based on
Subset Sum using our PKE scheme from Section 4.
5.1 Instantiantion from Decisional Diffie-Hellman
5.1.1 The PKE Scheme of Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky
We recall the PKE scheme put forward by Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky [BHHO08]
(BHHO in what follows). Let G be a group of prime-order q. For randomly selected generators
g1, . . . , g`←$G, define params := (G, g1, . . . , g`, q). The public key is pk := h :=
∏`
i=i g
zi
i
for a secret key sk := (z1, ..., z`) ∈ Z`q. Given the public parameters params and a message
m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm samples a random r←$ Zq and outputs c = (c1, ..., c`+1) =
(gr1, . . . , g
r
` ,m · hr).
Note that, by setting ` = 1, the BHHO PKE scheme is identical to ElGamal [ElG85], which
is CPA-secure under the DDH assumption in G. [BHHO08] showed that, for ` = d3 log qe, the
scheme is Faff -KDM-CPA secure under the DDH assumption, where the set Faff consists of all
affine functions over the secret key space. Naor and Segev [NS09] additionally prove that, for
` = 2 + Λ+ω(log λ)log q , the same PKE scheme is CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks.
On randomness fusion. Consider the following PPT algorithm Rand, taking as input a
pair of ciphertexts (c, c′) such that c := (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · hr) and c′ := (gr
′
1 , . . . , g
r′
` ,m
′ · (h′)r′),
and the auxiliary information aux := (h, h′, (z′1, . . . , z′`), r
′,m′). The algorithm performs the
following steps, where all operations are performed in the group G: (i) For each i ∈ [`], define
c˜i := ci · c′i; (ii) Compute c˜`+1 := c`+1 · hr
′
; (iii) Compute c˜′`+1 := c
′
`+1 ·
∏`
i=1 c
z′i
i ; (iv) Return
c˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜`, c˜`+1) and c˜
′ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜`, c˜′`+1).
One can easily see that the pair of ciphertexts returned by Rand is perfectly distributed to
a pair of BHHO encryptions with common (uniform) randomness r∗ := r + r′ mod q.
5.1.2 The Protocol
In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the BHHO PKE scheme, we
need to construct a Sigma-protocol for the following language:
LBHHONY = {(h, h′, c, c′) : ∃r ∈ Zq,m ∈ G s.t. c = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · hr), c′ = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · (h′)r)},
where c := (c1, ..., c`, c`+1) and c
′ := (c1, ..., c`, c′`+1) are BHHO encryptions with common
randomness r, using independent public keys pk := h and pk ′ := h′, and common public
parameters params = (G, g1, . . . , g`, q). The protocol Σ = (P,V) is described below:
• P chooses s←$ Zq and defines the commitment to be α := (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) := (gs1, . . . ,
gs` , (h/h
′)s).
• V replies with a random β←$ Zq.
• P computes the response γ := s− βr.
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• Given a transcript (α, β, γ) and some statement (h, h′, c, c′) the verifier accepts it if and
only if αi = g
γ
i · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]), and also α`+1 = (h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β.
Next, we argue that the above protocol meets the required properties.
Completeness. Follows by inspection, as
gγi · cβi = gs−βri · cβi = gs−βri · gβri = gsi = αi
(h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β = (h/h′)s−βr · (h/h′)βr = (h/h′)s = α`+1.
Special soundness. Let (α, β, γ) and (α, β′, γ′) be two accepting transcripts for some y ∈
LBHHONY , such that β 6= β′. This means that, for all i ∈ [`], αi = gγi · cβi , and thus ci = gri for
r = (γ− γ′)(β′−β)−1. Note that for the same value of r is also holds that c`+1/c′`+1 = (h/h′)r,
and thus r is a valid witness for y ∈ LBHHONY .
HVZK. Consider the simulator that, upon input a statement y := (h, h′, (c1, . . . , c`+1), (c′1, . . . ,
c′`+1)) first samples β←$ Zq, γ←$ Zq, and then defines α = (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) such that αi :=
gγi · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]) and α`+1 := (h/h′)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β. It is easy to see that the above yields
an identical distribution to the one of honest transcripts (α, β, γ).
Quasi-unique responses. Assume that for some y := (h, h′, (c1, . . . , c`+1), (c′1, . . . , c′`+1)) ∈
LBHHONY there exist two accepting proofs (α, β, γ) and (α, β, γ
′). This means in particular that
(h/h′)γ = (h/h′)γ′ , and thus γ ≡ γ′ (mod q).
5.2 Instantiation from Quadratic Residuosity
5.2.1 The PKE Scheme of Brakerski and Goldwasser
We recall the PKE encryption scheme put forward by Brakerski and Goldwasser [BG10] (BG
in what follows). Let GU = GM ×GL be a group such that GM is cyclic, and the orders of GM
and GL are relatively prime and denoted by M and L (respectively). For randomly selected
generators g1, . . . , g`←$GL, define params := (GU ,GM ,GL, g1, . . . , g`,M,L, T ) with T ≥M ·L.
The public key is pk := g0 :=
∏`
i=i g
−zi
i for a secret key sk := (z1, ..., z`) ∈ {0, 1}`. Given the
public parameters params and a message m ∈ GM , the encryption algorithm samples a random
r←$ [T 2] and outputs c = (c1, ..., c`+1) = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · gr0).
[BG10] showed that, for ` = logL + ω(log λ), the scheme is Faff -KDM-CPA secure under
the Subgroup Indistinguishability assumption,4 where the set Faff consists of all affine functions
over the secret key space. For ` = Λ + log(ML) + ω(log λ), the same PKE scheme is also
CPA-secure under Λ-key-leakage attacks.
On randomness fusion. The proof that the BG PKE scheme meets the randomness fusion
property of Definition 5 follows along the same lines of BHHO.
4This assumption states that random elements from GU are computationally indistinguishable from random
elements from GL, and it includes the Quadratic Residuosity and Paillier’s Decisional Composite Residuosity
assumptions as a special case [BG10].
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5.2.2 The Protocol
In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the BG PKE scheme, we need
to construct a Sigma-protocol for the following language:
LBGNY = {(g0, g′0, c, c′) : ∃r ∈ [T 2],m ∈ GM s.t. c = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m ·gr0), c′ = (gr1, . . . , gr` ,m · (g′0)r)},
where c := (c1, ..., c`, c`+1) and c
′ := (c1, ..., c`, c′`+1) are BG encryptions with common random-
ness r, using independent public keys pk := g0 and pk
′ := g′0, and common public parameters
params = (GU ,GM ,GL, g1, . . . , g`,M,L, T ). The protocol Σ = (P,V) is described below:
• P chooses s←$ [T 2] and defines the commitment to be α := (α1, . . . , α`, α`+1) := (gs1, . . . ,
gs` , (g0/g
′
0)
s).
• V replies with a random β←$ [T 2].
• P computes the response γ := s− βr.
• Given a transcript (α, β, γ) and some statement (g0, g′0, c, c′) the verifier accepts it if and
only if αi = g
γ
i · cβi (for all i ∈ [`]), and also α`+1 = (g0/g′0)γ · (c`+1/c′`+1)β.
The proof that the above Sigma-protocol satisfies completeness, special soundness, HVZK, and
quasi-unique responses is similar to the case of BHHO and is therefore omitted.
5.3 Instantiation from Subset Sum
Next, we turn to our PKE scheme based on Subset Sum from Section 4.
On randomness fusion. We show that the scheme from Section 4 fulfills a slight variation
of the randomness fusion property of Definition 5. First, we need that both public keys use the
same component A. Since A is independent of the secret key, this is not an issue and therefore
A could be seen as a public parameter. Further, we need some leakage on the randomness R of
a ciphertext. Exploiting the leftover-hash lemma, it is easy to see that our PKE scheme from
Section 4 is still secure when for a ciphertext C1 = RA, c2 = R(As + e(A, s)) + mbp/2c the
value Re(A, s′) is leaked, as long as s′ is independent of s. By the leftover-hash lemma there
exists a negligible function ν : N→ [0, 1] such that
∆
(
(RA,Re(A, s),Re(A, s′)); (U,Re(A, s),Re(A, s′)
) ≤ ν(λ)
∆
(
(RA,Ra,Re(A, s′)); (U,u,Re(A, s′)
) ≤ ν(λ),
for uniform U, a and u. Therefore, the leakage Re(A, s′) increases the statistical distance of
the component C1 of a normal ciphertext from uniform only by a negligible term, and the same
also holds for a uniform “ciphertext” (C1, c2). This is sufficient for Theorem 4 which guarantees
the security of the PKE scheme.
Given leakage Re(A, s′), ciphertexts C = (C1, c2) = (RA,Rt + mbp/2c), C ′ = (C′1, c′2) =
(R′A,R′t′ + m′bp/2c), and auxiliary information aux := (t, t′, s′,R′,m′,Re(A, s)), we can
compute
C˜ := (C1 + C
′
1, c2 + R
′t′)
which is a ciphertext for randomness R+R′. For computing C˜ ′ we need to exploit the knowledge
of the leakage and compute
C˜ ′ := (C1 + C′1, c
′
2 + C1s + Re(A, s
′)),
which is also a ciphertext for randomness R + R′. Clearly, R + R′ does not have the same dis-
tribution as R. Hence, a ciphertext using randomness R is not statistically close to a ciphertext
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with randomness R + R′. We modify the encryption algorithm of the PKE scheme from Sec-
tion 4 such that it uses randomness R∗ := R+R′ instead of R and call it Π′ = (Gen,Enc′,Dec).
The correctness of the decryption will hold, when sampling R, R′ from [−b√p/4c, b√p/4c]`×m.
The leftover-hash lemma still yields
∆ ((A,u1,u2,R
∗A,R∗u1,R∗u2); (A,u1,u2,B)) ≤ `
2
4
√
22(n+2) log p+m−m log(p−1).
Thus, one could still choose m = 3n to obtain a negligible statistical distance.
Finally, we obtain a slightly weaker randomness fusion property where re-randomized ci-
phertexts of PKE Π are statistically close to ciphertexts of Π′. This variant is indeed sufficient
to apply the Naor-Yung paradigm with shared randomness (cf. Theorem 1).
The protocol. In order to instantiate our twist of the Naor-Yung paradigm with the Sub-
set Sum based PKE scheme from Section 4.2, we need to construct a Sigma-protocol for the
following language:
LBMVNY = {(pk , pk ′, C, C ′) : ∃R ∈ [−b
√
p/2c, b√p/2c]`×m,m ∈ Z`2
s.t. C = (RA,Rt + mbp/2c), C ′ = (RA,Rt′ + mbp/2c)},
where C := (C1, c2) and C
′ := (C′1, c′2) are encryptions with common randomness R, us-
ing independent public keys pk := (A, t) and pk ′ := (A, t′), and common public parameters
params = (A, n, p,m, `).5
It is easy to see that the above language can be equivalently defined as follows:
LBMVNY = {(A′,B) ∈ Zm×(n+1)p × Z`×(n+1)p : ∃R ∈ Z`×mp s.t. RA′ = B and ‖R‖∞ ≤ b
√
p/2c},
where A′ := (A, t − t′). This language can be seen as Syndrome decoding or Knapsack
LWE [MM11] over Zp. Stern gave a Sigma-protocol for this language over Z2, where the norm is
the Hamming weight [Ste93]. Unfortunately, the protocol heavily relies on permutations over Zn2
which preserve the Hamming weight. To extend the protocol to Zq for non-binary R, one would
need to extend the permutation to an isometry for the desired norm that keeps the algebraic
structure.
Therefore, we design the following Sigma-protocol Σ = (P,V), based on rejection sam-
pling [Lyu09]. This principle was improved in [DDLL13], and also applied in, e.g., [DPSZ12].
Rejection sampling is a method to sample from an arbitrary target probability distribution f ,
given a source bound to a different probability distribution g. Here, a sample x is picked from
g and is accepted with probability f(x)/(M · g(x)) where M is some positive real; in case of
rejection, the process is restarted. If f(x) ≤ Mg(x) for all x, it is not hard to prove that this
procedure produces exactly the distribution of f . Furthermore, M is the expected number of
times the procedure will need to be restarted, and it is crucial to keep M as small as possible.
Moreover, given that rejection sampling can be interpreted as sampling a random point (xi, yi)
in the area under the distribution M · g and accepting if and only if yi ≤ f(xi), reducing the
area between g and f will reduce M .
The following interactive protocol is designed to provide a proof pi only about a statement
b := rA′, for witness r ∈ R; however, repeating it ` times (which is the number of rows into
the actual witness R matrix), we obtain a proof system for the whole target language. It works
as described below, for a witness with norm ‖r‖∞ ≤ v.
5Strictly speaking each public key should contain a different matrix A; however the above variant is still
secure and yields a smaller key and proof size.
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• P picks a vector y according to the distribution Dmd , where Dmd is the discrete uniform
distribution over [−d, d]; hence, it sets A′ := (A, t−t′), as defined for the language LBMVNY ,
to compute α := yA′.
• V replies with a random bit β←$ {0, 1}.
• P computes γ := βr + y; if ‖γ‖∞ ≤ d− v then it sends γ and otherwise aborts.
• Given a transcript (α, β,γ), the verifier accepts it if and only if:
1. ‖γ‖∞ ≤ d− v;
2. γA′ = α + βb.
Note that we multiplied y with the matrix A′ in order to obtain the commitment α, because
for α = y and β = 1 the verifier could obtain the witness r trivially by subtracting γ −α.
The distribution of γ depends on the distribution of βr, and thus on the distribution of
r. In fact, the distribution of γ is almost Dmd shifted by the vector r when β = 1; otherwise
γ = y and the distribution of γ is exactly Dmd . Instead, the target distribution for γ is D
m
t ,
that denotes the discrete uniform distribution over [−d + v, d − v]m. For simplicity, we first
analyze the case m = 1. When β = 0, the distribution g behaves as the uniform distribution
over [−d, d], with probability mass function:
g1(x) =
1
2d+ 1
. (5)
Meanwhile, when β = 1, we need the convolution between g1(x) and the discrete uniform
distribution over [−v, v], from which both y and r are sampled. The possible outcomes (from
the joint distribution) are obtained by multiplying (2d+1) · (2v+1), where 2d+1 is the amount
of possible values for y and 2v+1 is the amount of possible values for r. Hence, inside the target
interval [−d+v, d−v], the accepting γ can assume 2v+1 combinations of outcomes from the joint
distribution, with probability 2v+1(2d+1)·(2v+1) =
1
2d+1 . Moreover, in the intervals [−d − v,−d + v]
and [d − v, d + v] we have a trapezoidal behavior, so that we obtain the following probability
mass function:
g2(x) =

u(x+ d+ v + 1) if − d− v ≤ x < −d+ v
1
2d+1 if − d+ v ≤ x < d− v
u(d+ v − x+ 1) if d− v ≤ x < d+ v
where u = ((2d+1)·(2v+1))−1. It follows that γ is sampled from the distribution 12g1(x)+12g2(x),
where both g1(x) and g2(x) share the same probability mass function
1
2d+1 within the interval
[−d+ v, d− v].
As stated before, the target distribution Dmt is the discrete uniform distribution over [−d+
v, d− v]; therefore, the probability mass function of the distribution f is:
f(x) =
1
2(d− v) + 1 .
With the aim of providing a bound for d, given that f(x)/g(x) ≤M , we compute f(x)/g(x) =
2d+1
2(d−v)+1 , which is always zero, except in the interval [−d+ v, d− v]. Hence, the probability of
rejecting is (
1− 1
M
)
=
2v
2d+ 1
.
A union bound yields 2mv2d+1 in the general case, i.e., m ∈ N. We set d− v ≤
b√p/2c
2 . Further, for,
e.g., v = Θ(n log2 n), d = Θ(mn log2 n), p = Θ(n4 log4 n) and m = 4n for suitable constants,
the probability of rejecting is a constant. Therefore the protocol runs in expected polynomial
time.
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Given the above analysis of the rejection sampling, we can easily prove the special soundness
and HVZK properties of our interactive protocol (the correctness property is easily verified). In
particular:
• Special Soundness: Let (α, β,γ) and (α, β′,γ ′) be two accepting transcripts, where
γ := y + βr, γ′ := y + β′r, and β 6= β′. We can compute
γA′ − γ ′A′ = (γ − γ ′)A′ = (β − β′)b,
where we used the fact that γA′ = α + βb and γ ′A′ = α + β′b. It follows that either
γ−γ ′ or γ ′−γ is the wanted witness, with magnitude ‖γ−γ ′‖∞ ≤ 2(d− v) ≤ b√p/2c =
Θ(n2 log2 n).
• HVZK: Firstly, the simulator samples γ←$ Dmt to obtain, uniformly at random, an
accepting response. Hence, given that γA′ = α + βb, and that β is provided as input to
the simulator, we can obtain the last value of the simulation by setting α := γA′ − βb.
It is easy to see that this simulation strategy yields an identical distribution to the one of
honest transcripts (α, β,γ).
A drawback of our protocol is that the extracted witness is by a factor n larger than the witness
used to perform the protocol. In order to be compatible with the KDM secure PKE scheme
from Section 4.2, we need to choose m and p somewhat larger such that, on the one hand, the
correctness holds for an extracted witness (i.e., a secret key of norm
√
p) and, on the other hand,
security holds for a secret key of norm n log2 n <
√
p ≈ n2 log2 n. Fortunately, the leftover-hash
lemma still applies for this parameter choice such that we can still rely on Lemma 2. Hence we
also obtain security for a secret key of smaller norm (i.e., lower entropy). As a consequence,
the security relates to a Subset Sum instance of a smaller density and therefore to a stronger
hardness assumption.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have studied a twist of the classical Naor-Yung paradigm [NY90] to boost CPA security to
CCA security, both under key-dependent message and key-leakage attacks. The twist consists
in having the two ciphertexts in the Naor-Yung PKE scheme share the same randomness.
In order to prove security, we require the underlying CPA-secure PKE scheme to satisfy an
additional property. The main benefit of our approach is that one can instantiate the NIZK
in the Naor-Yung PKE more efficiently, as we have explored in the random oracle model. We
have also constructed a new PKE scheme with KDM-CPA security under the Subset Sum
assumption, and showed that such a scheme can be used within our paradigm.
Open problems include to construct a PKE scheme with CPA security under key-leakage
attacks directly based on Subset Sum, or alternatively to show that our construction additionally
satisfies this property.6 Also, it would be interesting to analyze KDM security of our scheme
with multiple keys, and to construct a PKE scheme with KDM-CCA security directly based on
the Subset Sum assumption in the standard model, without relying on NIZK.
References
[ACPS09] Benny Applebaum, David Cash, Chris Peikert, and Amit Sahai. Fast cryptographic
primitives and circular-secure encryption based on hard learning problems. In
CRYPTO, pages 595–618, 2009.
6The PKE scheme of [LPS10] only achieves a weak for of leakage resilience, where the leakage cannot depend
on the public key.
29
[ADW09a] Joe¨l Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Daniel Wichs. Leakage-resilient public-key cryp-
tography in the bounded-retrieval model. In CRYPTO, pages 36–54, 2009.
[ADW09b] Joe¨l Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Daniel Wichs. Survey: Leakage resilience and the
bounded retrieval model. In ICITS, pages 1–18, 2009.
[AGV09] Adi Akavia, Shafi Goldwasser, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Simultaneous hardcore
bits and cryptography against memory attacks. In TCC, pages 474–495, 2009.
[AP11] Joe¨l Alwen and Chris Peikert. Generating shorter bases for hard random lattices.
Theory Comput. Syst., 48(3):535–553, 2011.
[App11] Benny Applebaum. Key-dependent message security: Generic amplification and
completeness. In EUROCRYPT, pages 527–546, 2011.
[App14] Benny Applebaum. Key-dependent message security: Generic amplification and
completeness. J. Cryptology, 27(3):429–451, 2014.
[BBS03] Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, and Jessica Staddon. Randomness re-use in
multi-recipient encryption schemeas. In PKC, pages 85–99, 2003.
[BDPR98] Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway. Relations
among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes. In CRYPTO, pages
26–45, 1998.
[BFW15] David Bernhard, Marc Fischlin, and Bogdan Warinschi. Adaptive proofs of knowl-
edge in the random oracle model. In PKC, pages 629–649, 2015.
[BFW16] David Bernhard, Marc Fischlin, and Bogdan Warinschi. On the hardness of proving
CCA-security of signed ElGamal. In PKC, pages 47–69, 2016.
[BG10] Zvika Brakerski and Shafi Goldwasser. Circular and leakage resilient public-key
encryption under subgroup indistinguishability. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2010/226, 2010.
[BGK11] Zvika Brakerski, Shafi Goldwasser, and Yael Tauman Kalai. Black-box circular-
secure encryption beyond affine functions. In TCC, pages 201–218, 2011.
[BGV12] Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. (leveled) fully homo-
morphic encryption without bootstrapping. In Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations
in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, pages 309–325. ACM, 2012.
[BHHO08] Dan Boneh, Shai Halevi, Michael Hamburg, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Circular-secure
encryption from decision Diffie-Hellman. In CRYPTO, pages 108–125, 2008.
[BJLM13] Daniel J. Bernstein, Stacey Jeffery, Tanja Lange, and Alexander Meurer. Quantum
algorithms for the subset-sum problem. In PQCrypto, pages 16–33, 2013.
[Ble98] Daniel Bleichenbacher. Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the
RSA encryption standard PKCS #1. In CRYPTO, pages 1–12, 1998.
[BMV16] Silvio Biagioni, Daniel Masny, and Daniele Venturi. Naor-Yung paradigm with
shared randomness and applications. In SCN, pages 62–80, 2016.
[BR93] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for
designing efficient protocols. In ACM CCS, pages 62–73, 1993.
30
[BRS02] John Black, Phillip Rogaway, and Thomas Shrimpton. Encryption-scheme security
in the presence of key-dependent messages. In SAC, pages 62–75, 2002.
[BSW13] Elette Boyle, Gil Segev, and Daniel Wichs. Fully leakage-resilient signatures. J.
Cryptology, 26(3):513–558, 2013.
[CCS09] Jan Camenisch, Nishanth Chandran, and Victor Shoup. A public key encryption
scheme secure against key dependent chosen plaintext and adaptive chosen cipher-
text attacks. In EUROCRYPT, pages 351–368, 2009.
[CDTV16] Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Bjo¨rn Tackmann, and Daniele Venturi. Non-
malleable encryption: Simpler, shorter, stronger. In TCC, pages 306–335, 2016.
[CL01] Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya. An efficient system for non-transferable
anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation. In EUROCRYPT,
pages 93–118, 2001.
[CS98] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. A practical public key cryptosystem provably
secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In CRYPTO, pages 13–25, 1998.
[DDLL13] Le´o Ducas, Alain Durmus, Tancre`de Lepoint, and Vadim Lyubashevsky. Lattice
signatures and bimodal gaussians. In CRYPTO, pages 40–56, 2013.
[DDN91] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryptography (ex-
tended abstract). In ACM STOC, pages 542–552, 1991.
[DDV10] Francesco Dav`ı, Stefan Dziembowski, and Daniele Venturi. Leakage-resilient stor-
age. In SCN, pages 121–137, 2010.
[DH76] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
Trans. Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[DHLW10] Yevgeniy Dodis, Kristiyan Haralambiev, Adriana Lo´pez-Alt, and Daniel Wichs.
Efficient public-key cryptography in the presence of key leakage. In ASIACRYPT,
pages 613–631, 2010.
[Do¨t15] Nico Do¨ttling. Low noise LPN: KDM secure public key encryption and sample
amplification. In PKC, pages 604–626, 2015.
[DP08] Stefan Dziembowski and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Leakage-resilient cryptography. In
IEEE FOCS, pages 293–302, 2008.
[DPSZ12] Ivan Damg˚ard, Valerio Pastro, Nigel P. Smart, and Sarah Zakarias. Multiparty
computation from somewhat homomorphic encryption. In CRYPTO, pages 643–
662, 2012.
[DV14] O¨zgu¨r Dagdelen and Daniele Venturi. A second look at Fischlin’s transformation.
In AFRICACRYPT, pages 356–376, 2014.
[ElG85] Taher ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 31(4):469–472, 1985.
[FHV13] Sebastian Faust, Carmit Hazay, and Daniele Venturi. Outsourced pattern matching.
In ICALP, pages 545–556, 2013.
31
[Fis05] Marc Fischlin. Communication-efficient non-interactive proofs of knowledge with
online extractors. In CRYPTO, pages 152–168, 2005.
[FKMV12] Sebastian Faust, Markulf Kohlweiss, Giorgia Azzurra Marson, and Daniele Venturi.
On the non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir transform. In INDOCRYPT, pages
60–79, 2012.
[FMV16] Sebastian Faust, Daniel Masny, and Daniele Venturi. Chosen-ciphertext security
from subset sum. In PKC, pages 35–46, 2016.
[FNV15] Antonio Faonio, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Daniele Venturi. Mind your coins: Fully
leakage-resilient signatures with graceful degradation. In ICALP, pages 456–468,
2015.
[FO99] Eiichiro Fujisaki and Tatsuaki Okamoto. How to enhance the security of public-key
encryption at minimum cost. In PKC, pages 53–68, 1999.
[FS86] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identifi-
cation and signature problems. In CRYPTO, pages 186–194, 1986.
[Gen09] Craig Gentry. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. PhD thesis, Stanford Uni-
versity, 2009.
[GM84] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption. J. Comput. Syst. Sci.,
28(2):270–299, 1984.
[HILL99] Johan H˚astad, Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A. Levin, and Michael Luby. A pseudo-
random generator from any one-way function. SIAM J. Comput., 28(4):1364–1396,
1999.
[Hof13] Dennis Hofheinz. Circular chosen-ciphertext security with compact ciphertexts. In
EUROCRYPT, pages 520–536, 2013.
[IN96] Russell Impagliazzo and Moni Naor. Efficient cryptographic schemes provably as
secure as subset sum. J. Cryptology, 9(4):199–216, 1996.
[KJJ99] Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. Differential power analysis. In
CRYPTO, pages 388–397, 1999.
[KMHT16] Fuyuki Kitagawa, Takahiro Matsuda, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Keisuke Tanaka. On
the key dependent message security of the Fujisaki-Okamoto constructions. In PKC,
pages 99–129, 2016.
[Koc96] Paul C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS,
and other systems. In CRYPTO, pages 104–113, 1996.
[KV09] Jonathan Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Signature schemes with bounded leak-
age resilience. In ASIACRYPT, pages 703–720, 2009.
[LPS10] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Adriana Palacio, and Gil Segev. Public-key cryptographic
primitives provably as secure as subset sum. In TCC, pages 382–400, 2010.
[Lyu09] Vadim Lyubashevsky. Fiat-Shamir with aborts: Application to lattice and factoring-
based signatures. In ASIACRYPT, pages 598–616, 2009.
32
[MM11] Daniele Micciancio and Petros Mol. Pseudorandom knapsacks and the sample com-
plexity of LWE search-to-decision reductions. In CRYPTO, pages 465–484, 2011.
[MRS88] Silvio Micali, Charles Rackoff, and Bob Sloan. The notion of security for proba-
bilistic cryptosystems. SIAM J. Comput., 17(2):412–426, 1988.
[NS09] Moni Naor and Gil Segev. Public-key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage. In
CRYPTO, pages 18–35, 2009.
[NS12] Moni Naor and Gil Segev. Public-key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage. SIAM
J. Comput., 41(4):772–814, 2012.
[NVZ14] Jesper Buus Nielsen, Daniele Venturi, and Angela Zottarel. Leakage-resilient sig-
natures with graceful degradation. In PKC, pages 362–379, 2014.
[NY90] Moni Naor and Moti Yung. Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen
ciphertext attacks. In ACM STOC, pages 427–437, 1990.
[PSV07] Rafael Pass, Abhi Shelat, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Relations among notions of
non-malleability for encryption. In ASIACRYPT, pages 519–535, 2007.
[QS01] Jean-Jacques Quisquater and David Samyde. Electromagnetic analysis (EMA):
measures and counter-measures for smart cards. In E-smart, pages 200–210, 2001.
[Reg05] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. In ACM STOC, pages 84–93, 2005.
[Reg09] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. J. ACM, 56(6), 2009.
[RS91] Charles Rackoff and Daniel R. Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In CRYPTO, pages 433–444, 1991.
[Sah99] Amit Sahai. Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-
ciphertext security. In IEEE FOCS, pages 543–553, 1999.
[SPY+10] Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert, Olivier Pereira, Yu Yu, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Moti
Yung, and Elisabeth Oswald. Leakage resilient cryptography in practice. In Towards
Hardware-Intrinsic Security - Foundations and Practice, pages 99–134. Springer,
2010.
[Ste93] Jacques Stern. A new identification scheme based on syndrome decoding. In
CRYPTO, pages 13–21, 1993.
[Unr12] Dominique Unruh. Quantum proofs of knowledge. In EUROCRYPT, pages 135–
152, 2012.
[Wee16] Hoeteck Wee. KDM-security via homomorphic smooth projective hashing. In PKC,
pages 159–179, 2016.
[Yao82] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. Theory and applications of trapdoor functions (extended
abstract). In IEEE FOCS, pages 80–91, 1982.
33
